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Commercialization of the Internet has triggered an explosion of development 
aimed at maximizing on-line communication. Multi-platform client-server 
installations are becoming the enterprise network norm, and market forces are 
causing new resources to be driven into networks on an almost daily basis. 
Competitive pressures and a growing acceptance of remote management and 
telecommuting are fueling the development explosion, and the end is not yet in sight. 
This has put network administrators in a challenging position: They are being asked 
to provide wide-scale, open access to heterogeneous networks, but to do so without 
compromising overall security. The Computer Science Department at the University 
of Montana may upgrade some older RS6000 workstations (AIX4.1) with Pentium 
PC workstations (Redhat LINUX). So we need a mechanism to unify the 
heterogeneous networks (including AIX 4.1, Redhat LINUX, and NT4.0). At the 
same time, we want to secure our heterogeneous networks as well as possible. The 
Kerberos Authentication Server is a desirable solution to this situation. Kerberos 
Authentication Server provides a common security implementation at a very basic 
level that prevents the weaknesses of one system from compromising the strengths of 
the other.
Director: Alden H. Wijight^/
Contents
1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Problem Description...............................................................................................1
1.2 Proposed Solution................................................................................................... 3
2 Kerberos Authentication Server...................................................................................5
2.1 History of Kerberos................................................................................................ 5
2.2 Authentication, Integrity, Confidentiality, and Authorization............................7
2.3 How Kerberos works..............................................................................................8
2.3.1 Kerberos Encryption..........................................................................................8
2.3.2 What are the Kerberos Tickets.........................................................................9
2.3.3 How Kerberos Authentication Works............................................................. 9
2.3.4 Kerberos Cross-Realm Authentication.......................................................... 15
2.4 Kerberos V4 vs. Kerberos V 5.............................................................................18
2.5 Kerberos Limitations............................................................................................ 21
3 Implementation of Unification.................................................................................23
3.1 Possible Implementations..................................................................................... 23
3.1.1 The KDC servers............................................................................................. 23
3.1.2 The Application Servers and Clients..............................................................24
3.1.3 Some Issues about the login process..............................................................25
3.1.3.1 Local Login to Unix workstation(AIX, Redhat LINUX).....................25
3.1.3.2 Local Logon to NT Workstation/Server............................................... 26
3.1.3.3 Over-the-network telnet from Windows 95/N T to U N IX .................28
3.1.4 Password Synchronization and User Account Setup....................................30
3.1.5 The Cost of Deploying Kerberos....................................................................33
3.2 Two Test Network Models.................................................................................. 33
4 A Multi-threaded Implementation of Kerberized FTP for Windows 95/N T  36
4.1 Using “Kerberized” Applications........................................................................36
4.2 Introduction to GSSAPI.......................................................................................37
4.3 FTP Security Extension....................................................................................... 39
4.3.1 Introduction...................................................................................................... 39
4.3.2 The FTP Security Extension Standard........................................................... 40
4.4 Implementation of Kerberized FTP....................................................................41
4.4.1 Implementation of the Authentication P a rt.................................................. 42
4.4.2 How to use the Kerberized FT P .....................................................................44
5 Conclusions................................................................................................................... 49
iv
List of Figures
Figure 2.1. Complete Kerberos V4 Authentication Protocal (simplified).................... 12
Figure 2.2. Complete Kerberos V5 Authentication Protocal (simplified).................... 13
Figure 2.3. Kerberos V4 Inter-realm Authentication Protocol (simplified)................. 15
Figure 2.4. Kerberos V5 Inter-realm Authentication Protocol (simplified)................. 16
Figure 2.5. Kerberos V4 Realm Interconnections........................................................... 19
Figure 2.6. Kerberos V5 Hierarchy of Realms.................................................................19
Figure 3.1. Interface of ntpasswd..................................................................................... 32
Figure 3.2. Model O n e ...................................................................................................... 35
Figure 3.3. Model T w o ..................................................................................................... 35
Figure 4.1. Login Authentication State Diagram.............................................................43
Figure 4.2. Initial Kerbnet Interface................................................................................. 44
Figure 4.3. After obtaining Ticket Granting Ticket........................................................ 45
Figure 4.4. GSS_FTP Initial Interface.............................................................................46
Figure 4.5. After Logon..................................................................................................... 47
Figure 4.6. After obtaining FTP service ticket................................................................48
Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Problem Description
In recent years, multi-platform distributed computing installations are becoming 
more popular. With the use of the Internet becoming more and more extensive, the 
networks that were previously private are now connected to the Internet. That 
exposes a lot of security problems on an open network.
This has put network administrators in a challenging position: They are being 
asked to provide wide-scale, open access to heterogeneous networks and to achieve 
higher security. Perhaps the most difficult problem is to unify the UNIX/NT/M AC 
networks. UN IX/NT/M AC administrators have the formidable task of 
implementing disparate security solutions on fundamentally different operating 
systems, then combining those solutions to create uniform access and management 
across the entire network. The risk is that the combined solution can yield a result 
that is weaker than the weakest link of any single operating system’s security alone.
The CS department of the University of Montana may replace some old AIX 
workstations with LINUX workstations. So the CS department needs a mechanism 
to maintain a global user account database for the heterogeneous networks (including
1
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AIX 4.1, LINUX, NT 4.0) At the same time, the CS department wants to secure the
heterogeneous networks as well as possible. After the replacement, the CS
department will have AIX workstations, LINUX workstations, and NT workstations.
The goals are:
• A Global user account database, which means that any user must be able to login 
to the same account with the same password on any workstation
• Users should be able to change their passwords from any workstation
• Any system must work with a shadow password system on both AIX and LINUX
• Users should be able to access any workstation over the Internet (for example, a 
student or faculty should be able to login to a workstation using a PPP 
connection to an ISP from home)
• Unencrypted passwords should not be transferred over the network
• The solution should be relatively easy for the system administrator to maintain
• All of the system administrator’s tasks and as many as possible of other tasks 
should be able to be done through an encrypted session
• The solution should be easy for users to use
• The client programs like FTP and TELNET should be easy for CS students to 
install on personally-owned PCs
1.2 Proposed Solution
3
The fundamental issue in implementing security for a U N IX /N T environment is 
to provide a common security implementation at a very basic level that prevents the 
weaknesses of one system from compromising the strengths of the other. The richer 
this common implementation is, the more security can be enhanced for both systems.
The Kerberos Authentication Server, which was developed by MIT, IBM and 
DEC implements a third-party authentication layer that unifies UNIX and NT user 
administration, authentication, and authorization, and provides functional uniformity 
for administering.
Cygnus Inc. developed a commercial version of Kerberos, KerbNet, which 
contains Kerberos server and client applications for both UNIX and NT. Using a set 
of technologies that create a security layer which is implemented and managed 
identically on both UNIX and NT systems, KerbNet software was announced to 
conform the following U N IX /N T distinctions:
Since a user-ID in N T  is completely alien to U N IX  and vice-versa, the most difficult 
components to unify are the different user authentication models. KerbNet software surmounts this 
problem by utilising a single trusted server which other systems access over the network. This trusted 
server provides a central repository for usernames and passwords, as well as some access control audit 
information.
KerbNet software authenticates users and application servers and provides administrators with a 
unified method of managing passwords and access on allplaforms in the system. With enterprise-
4
wide authentication, administrators are assured of the identities of users and servers. With this 
assurance, single sign-on can be used system-wide at both network and application levels.
From a user standpoint, the KerbNet interface provides single-login convenience and seamless 
access to network resources. From an application-development standpoint, KerbNet software relieves 
developers of the burden of having to provide functionality to accommodate new users or groups.
Sind for administrators, KerbNet software provides a uniform interface from which they can see 
exactly who users are at any moment and add, delete, or manage identifications and authorisations 
system-wide, regardless of the operating system plaform. [14]
Actually from my point of view, KerbNet doesn’t achieve all of the above. If 
Kerbnet is really used to unify Unix/NT/M ac environment, there is a password 
synchronization problem. Due to the conflict of the NT native authentication 
protocol and the Kerberos authentication protocol, in order to achieve single sign-on, 
a user’s NT domain password must be the same as the user’s Kerberos password. I 
will talk about this in detail in chapter 3.
At a recent developer’s conference, Microsoft announced that NT version 5.0 will 
include Kerberos authentication. This endorsement of Kerberos legitimizes the 
technology as a foundation for network security. With this initiative, Microsoft will 
also be making available Kerberized file and print services for current Windows 95 
installations. Microsoft's direction to provide NT Kerberos services and Kerberized 
applications ensures that future Windows NT and Windows 95 users will have full 
access to Internet standard security services.
Chapter 2 
Kerberos Authentication Server
2.1 History of Kerberos
In 1983, MIT, in cooperation with IBM and DEC, started an eight-year project 
designed to integrate computers into the university’s undergraduate curriculum. This 
project was called Project Athena.
At the beginning, nearly 50 traditional time-sharing minicomputers—Digital 
Equipment Corporation’s VAX 11/750 systems running Berkeley 4.2 UNIX, were 
used by project Athena. Each VAX had a few terminals; when a student or faculty 
member wanted to use a computer, he/she sat down at one of its terminals.
Within a few years, the project received a lot of funds to update equipment. 
Hundreds of networked workstations replaced the VAX 11/750s. The project's goal was 
to allow any user to sit down at any computer and enjoy fu ll access to his files and to the network 
[12].
After the workstations were deployed, the network was accessible from all over 
the MIT campus. It was impossible to prevent students (or outside intruders) from 
running network spy programs. It was also nearly impossible to prevent the students 
from intercepting the root user passwords of the workstations. Even worse, many of
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the computers on the network were IBM PC/ATs that didn’t have even the basic 
operating system security. Something had to he done to protect student files in the networked 
environment to the same degree that they were protected in the time-sharing environment [12].
Athena’s ultimate solution to this security problem was Kerberos. Kerberos is an 
authentication system that uses DES cryptography to protect sensitive information such as passwords 
on an open network. When a user logs in to a workstation running Kerberos, that user is issued a 
ticket from the Kerberos Authentication Server. The user’s ticket can only be decrypted with the 
user’s password; it contains information necessary to obtain additional tickets, From that point on, 
whenever the user wishes to access a network service, an appropriate ticket for that service must be 
presented. A s all of the information in the Kerberos tickets is encrypted before it is sent over the 
network, the information is not susceptible to eavesdropping or misappropriation [12].
2.2 Authentication, Integrity, Confidentiality, 
and Authorization
Neuman and Ts’o [1] give some general definitions:
• A  principa l is the party whose identity is verified.
• The verifier is the party who demands assurance of the principal’s identity.
• D ata in teg rity  is the assurance that the data received is the same as generated.
• A uthentica tion  is the verification of the identity of a party who generated some data, and of 
the integrity of the data.
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• C onfidentia lity is the protection of information from disclosure to those not intended to receive 
it.
• A uthoriza tion  is the process by which one determines whether a principal is allowed to 
perform an operation [1].
For example, when a user telnets to remote machine, the remote machine’s telnetd 
daemon is the verifier, the user is the principal, and the user’s identity need to be 
verified by the verifier — the remote telnetd daemon. Authorization is usually 
performed after the principal has been authenticated. Normally, authentication and 
authorization occur at the same time.
The section concentrates on authentication for real-time, interactive services that 
are offered on computer networks. The term real-time is used to mean that a client 
process is waiting for a response to a query or command so that it can display the 
results to the user. This class of services includes remote login, file system reads and 
writes, and information retrieval for applications like web browser.
2.3 H ow  Kerberos works
A series of encrypted messages is used by the Kerberos Authentication System to 
prove to a verifier (server) that a client is running on behalf of a real claimed user.
The remainder of this section describes the Kerberos protocol. The description is 
simplified for clarity; additional fields are present in the actual protocol. Readers
8
should consult RFC 1510 [4] for a more thorough description of the Kerberos 
protocol.
2.3.1 Kerberos Encryption
Kerberos is an authentication system based on the secret key cryptography. In the 
Kerberos Version 4, the only encryption method supported is the data encryption 
standard (DES). A property of DES is that if the encrypted data is decrypted with the 
same key used to encrypt it, the original data appears. If different encryption keys are 
used for encryption and decryption, or if the encrypted data is modified, the result 
will be unreadable, and the checksum in the Kerberos message will not match. Due 
to the U.S. regulation limiting the export of DES, in Kerberos Version 5, an 
encryption algorithm identifier tag is appended on each Kerberos message, which 
allows the user to configure Kerberos to use alternative encryption algorithm other 
than DES. But so far, all implementations of Kerberos Version 5 use DES. A 
standard for a public key version of Kerberos is under consideration.
2.3.2 What are the Kerberos Tickets
• Each service registered in Kerberos Authentication Server (KAS) needs to share a 
secret key with the KAS, this secret key is called the server key. For example, 
FTP, TELNET and other services need to share a server key with the KAS 
respectively.
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• A Service Granting Ticket (SGT) consists of a set of information that can be 
used by the client to apply for service provided by a specific application server. 
Normally, the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) issues a SGT. A separate SGT is 
needed for different service. For example, a FTP ticket is needed for the FTP 
service and a HOST ticket is needed for the TELNET service.
• Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) is issued by the KAS and used to obtain 
multiple SGTs from the TGS later within a limited period (normally 8 hours). The 
TGT is kind of like a general ticket for Disney Land. Once a tourist obtains this 
general ticket, the tourist can get the access to any service supplied by the Disney 
Land within a day.
2.3.3 H ow  Kerberos Authentication Works
Under Kerberos Version 5, the user first types in his/her user ID and password. 
Then the client sends a message to the KAS that includes the user ID, the name of 
the TGS service, the requested TGT expiration time, and a random number, all 
encrypted with the user’s password (message 1 in figures 2.1 and 2.2). The client uses 
this message to request a TGT for the user represented by itself. When the KAS 
receives the message, it finds the claimed user’s password from its password database, 
and tries to decrypt the message using the user’s password. If the decryption 
succeeds, the KAS assumes that the running client really represents the claimed user. 
Then the KAS generates a one-time encryption key known as the session key and a
10
TGT that contains the session key; the TGT is encrypted with the TGS server key 
and the session key with other information are encrypted with the user’s password. 
This prevents the TGT from being modified and guarantees that only the real user 
can extract the session key. The KAS sends the encrypted TGT and session key back 
to the client (message 2 in figures 2.1 and 2.2). The client decrypts the encrypted 
session key using the user’s password, stores the encrypted TGT and the decrypted 
session key into a temporary file, and forgets the user’s password. Next, the client will 
use the TGT and session key to obtain the SGTs as needed. Through messages 1 and 
2 in figures 2.1 and 2.2, the client obtains the TGT and session key without 
transferring the user’s password over the network at all.
When the user wants to use any service, the user needs to obtain a SGT for that 
requested service. The client sends the encrypted TGT and a request for that service 
which is encrypted with the TGS session key to the TGS (message 3 in figures 2.1 
and 2.2). Upon the receipt of the message 3, the TGS decrypts the encrypted TGT 
with its server key, extracts the session key and tries to decrypt that request with the 
session key. So the TGS knows that the client has requested a SGT for that requested 
service. Then the TGS generates another session key which is shared between the 
client and the requested service and encrypted with the original TGS session key, and 
an SGT for that requested service which contains the session key and is encrypted 
with that requested service’s server key. The TGS sends them back to the client 
(message 4 in figures 2.1 and 2.2).
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Upon the receipt of the message 4, the client decrypts the session key with the 
original TGS session key, and stores the encrypted SGT and the decrypted SGT 
session key into the same temporary file. Then the client sends the message 5 in 
figures 2.1 and 2.2 to the requested service. Message 5 consists of two parts: 
authenticator and encrypted SGT. The authenticator consists of the current time, a 
checksum, and an optional encryption key, all encrypted with the SGT session key. 
Upon the receipt of the message 5, the server decrypts the encrypted SGT with its 
server key, extracts the SGT session key, and tries to decrypt the authenticator. If the 
same key is used to encrypt and to decrypt on the same authenticator, the checksum 
in the authenticator will match. So the server can be sure that the client is running to 
represent the claimed user, since the client knows the session key. In some cases, the 
client wants to verify the identity of the server. If mutual-authentication is required, 
the message 6 in figures 2.1 and 2.2 is used.
At this point, the user has access to the service. Later, if the user wants to use 
other services, the client will go through from messages 3 and 5 (message 6, if 
needed) to obtain the corresponding SGT for the requested service and to get the 
access. The user doesn’t need to type his/her password anymore. The single sign-on 
is achieved by obtaining the TGT through messages 1 and 2 in figures 2.1 and 2.2.
For further details of the Kerberos Authentication Server, please see [1, 2, 3, 4,
15]-
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TGS
i
ServerClient
1. Client KAS: C, Tgs, Tim eexp, N
2. KAS -> Client: {KcTgs ,Tgs, Timeexp,N, {Tc>TgJ K Xf,s}Kc
3. Client ^  TGS: {CT, ... }I<c>Tgs, {Tc>Tgs}KTgs, Tim eexp , N
4. TG S Client: {K ^  , V, Tim eexp, N, . . . }Kc,Tgs, {TC,V}KV
5. Client -»  Server {CT, CK, K opt, . . .  }KCV, {T ,,}K V
6. Server Client {CT,.. . }KCV (optional)
KAS: K erberos Authentication Server
TGS: Ticket Granting Service (usually exists in the same machine with KAS)
C: Client’s name
V: Verifier’s name (Server’s name)
Tgs: T G S’s name
N: A random  num ber (used to m atch the authentication response 
with the request)
Tim eexp: Requested expiration time for the ticket 
C T: Current time 
CK: Checksum 
K c: U ser’s password
K^: Server key (shared between server and KAS)
K cv: Session key (Client with Server)
K cTgs: Session key ( Client with TGS)
T. lg;  Ticket to TGS {Kc>Tgs, C, Timecxp, ...}
T c v: Ticket to the Server {Kc v , C, Tim eexp, . ..}
Figure 2.1 C om plete Kerberos V4 A uthenticaion Protocol (sim plified)
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Client Server
1. Client -> KAS: C , {C, Tgs, T im e ^ , N }K C
2. KAS CHent: {Kc>Tgs,Tgs, Tim eexp,N }K c , {Tc,Tgs}KTgs
3. CUent ^  TGS: {CT, . . . }Kc>Tgs, {TCiTgs}KTgs, Timeexp , N
4. T G S ^  CUent: {Kc>v , V, Tim eexp, N , ... }Kc;rgs, { T J K ,
5. CUent Server {CT, CK, K opt, ... }KC>V, { T ^ K ,
6. Server Client {CT,.. . }KCV (optional)
KAS: K eberos Authentication Server
TGS: Ticket Granting Service (usually exists in the same machine with KAS)
C: CHent5 s name
V: Verifier's name (Server's name)
Tgs: TG S's name
N: A  random  num ber(used to m atch the authentication response 
with the request)
Tim eexp: Requested expiration time for the ticket 
CT: Current time 
CK: Checksum 
K c: User's password
K^: Server key (shared between server and KAS)
K c v: Session key (CHent with Server)
K CjTgs: Session key ( CHent with TGS)
T c,Tgs: Ticket to TGS {KcTgs, C, Timeexp, ...}
T c v: Ticket to the Verifier(Server) {Kc v , C, Tim eexp, . ..}
Figure 2.2 C om plete Kerberos Version 5 A uthenticaion Protocol (sim plified)
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2.3.4 Kerberos Cross-Realm Authentication
A. full-service Kerberos environment consisting of a Kerberos server, a number of clients and a 
number of application servers, requires the following:
• The Kerberos server must have the User ID and password of all participating users in its
database. A.H users are registered with Kerberos server.
• The Kerberos server must share a secret key with each server. A.U servers are registered with the
Kerberos server.
Such an environment is referred to as a realm  [15].
It’s impractical for networks in different organizations to register in the same 
realm. Instead, the networks in different organizations are in different realms. 
Sometimes, a user registered in one realm needs to use the server registered in 
another realm, which leads to a cross-realm authentication problem. To enable the 
cross-realm authentication between two realms, a secret key needs to be generated 
and shared between the two realms. In order for a user registered in the local realm to 
use a server registered in a remote realm, the user must obtain a SGT for the remote 
server. The client uses messages 1 and 2 in figures 2.3 and 2.4 to obtain the TGT for 
the remote realm. Then the client uses the TGT for the remote realm to request a 
SGT for the remote server from the remote TGS through the messages 3 and 4 from 
figures 2.3 and 2.4. As soon as the remote KAS detects that the TGT was issued in a 
different realm, it finds the cross-realm key, verifies the validity of the TGT, and then 
generates and issues a SGT and session key to the remote client. The authentication
15
of the local client to the remote server is the same as that in the same realm. For 
further details of Kerberos cross-realm authentication, please see [1, 3].
remote
Server,Clientlocal remote
1. Client TG Sloca]: {Ac}Kc>tgs, tgsiem , {Tctgs}K,gs
2. TG Sloca, Client: {K^jtgsrem,{Tc,tgsrm}Ktgsrem}K c>tgs
3. Client TG Siemote: {Ac}K Cjtgsrem, {Tc,tgsrcm}Ktgsrem, Srem 
4- T G Sremote Client: { K c > w  {Tc,srem}Ksrem}Kc,,gs„m
5. CUent ServetrcmoK: {Ac} K c > w  {Tc,srem }K S[em
6. Serverremote -> CUent: {A J K c,Srem (optional)
A c: A uthenticator (different for different message)
TG SlocaI: Local Ticket Granting Service 
T G Sremote. Remote Ticket Granting Service
tgs: T G Slocal’s name 
tgsrem : TG Slemote’s name 
K c>t : Session key ( Client with TG Sloca])
K^gSrem: Session key( CUent with TG Sremote)
Kc,srem • Session key ( Client with Remote Server)
T c,tgs: Ticket to TG Slocal
T c .tg w  Ticket to TG Slemote
K ^ : TG Slocal key known only by TG Sloca]
Krgsrem: Inter-realm  key shared with TG Slocal and T G Sremote 
K Srem: Remote Server key shared with TG Sremote
Figure 2.3 Kerberos V4 Inter-realm A uthenticaion Protocol (simplified)
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local remote
Server,remote
1. Client -> TG Slncal: { A JK ctgs, tgsrera , { T ^ J K ^
2. T G S]oc,| -> Client: {Kc,tgstem }Kc,tgs, {Tc,tgsrern }Ktgs,ern
3. C lie n t-^  TG Sremot(,: {AJIC;,tgs[ern, {’l'c,tgs[em} Ktgsr,.rn, Sr,.,
4. T G Stemot(, Client: {K c,s[em}Kc,tgsrera, {Tc,srera }K S[em
5. C H e n f>  Servertemote:{A J Kc,srem, {Tc,stem}Kstem
6. Serverremote CHent: {A J K c,srera (optional)
A c: A uthenticator (different for different message) 
TG Slocal: Local Ticket Granting Service 
TG Sremote. Remote Ticket Granting Service
tgs: TG Slocal’s name 
tgs rem : T GSremoK’s name 
K c tgs: Session key ( Client with TG Slocal)
K c,tgsrem: Session key( Client with TG Sremote)
K c,srem: Session key ( Client with Remote Server)
T c,tgs: Ticket to TG Slocal 
Tc,tgsfem: Ticket to T G Sremotc
T G Slocalkey known only by T G Slocal 
I<Ctgsrern: Inter-realm  key shared with TG Slocal and TG Sremote 
Ksrem: Remote Server key shared with TG Sremote
Figure 2.4 Kerberos V5 Inter-realm A uthenticaion Protocol (sim plified)
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2.4 Kerberos Version 4 vs. Kerberos Version 5
Initial login:
With Kerberos Version 4, after a user types his/her ID, the client sends a message 
to the Kerberos Authentication Server (KAS) that includes the user’s ID, a request for a 
TGT, and other information. The KAS checks its database, finds the user’s password, 
sends back a credential that is encrypted with the user’s password. The client then 
prompts the user to type in his/her password and finally tries to decrypt the 
encrypted credential with the password that the user has typed. If the decryption is 
successful, the client then forgets the user’s password, and stores the credential into a 
temporary file. If the decryption fails, the client knows that the user typed the wrong 
password and gives the user a chance to try again. This scenario makes Kerberos 
Version 4 susceptible to offline password-guessing attacks. An attacker could simply 
modify the login program, ask a KAS for a TGT for a particular user, then copy it 
into a file, then try to decrypt that ticket with every word in the dictionary. For 
example, an attacker might write a kerberized “kinit” for W in95/NT that obtains the 
TGT, but this “kinit” simply stores the encrypted TGT into a file. Since the PC on 
which the attacker is running the “kinit” is entirely under the control of the attacker, 
the attacker can apply a password-guessing process at his/her leisure.
With Kerberos Version 5, the client doesn’t contact the KAS until the user has 
typed his/her password. Then the client sends a message to the KAS that consists of 
the user’s ID, a request for a TGT, a random number and etc., all encrypted with the
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user’s password. The KAS looks up the user’s ID, finds his/her password, and tries 
to decrypt the message. If the decryption succeeds, the KAS then creates a credential 
that is encrypted with the user’s password, and sends it back to the user. The KAS 
can be set up to allow a fixed number of login attempts. This will effectively prevent 
a password-guessing process.
Inter-realm Authentication:
With Kereros Version 4, in order to connect n realms completely, 1) key
exchanges are required (see figure 2.5). Even with only a few cooperating realms, the 
assignment and management of the inter-realm keys is an expensive task.
With Version 5, a hierarchy based on the name of the realm is supported (see 
figure 2.6). A source realm can communicate directly with a destination realm if it 
shares an inter-realm key direcdy with the destination realm. Or if it shares a key with 
an intermediate realm that shares an inter-realm key with the destination realm, the 
source realm can communicate with the destination realm through the intermediate 
realm too. Each realm needs to share a unique inter-realm key with its parent node 
and each of its child nodes. This arrangement reduces the number of key exchanges 
to 0(log(n)).
For further details, please see [1, 3].
CS.UMT.EDU
MIT.EDUUMT.EDU
BERKELEY.EDUEDU
Figure 2.5: Kerberos Y4 realm interconnections
Shortcut Link
BERICELEY.EDU
CS.UMT.EDU
UMT.EDU
EDU
MIT.EDU
Figure 2.6: Kerberos V5 hierarchy o f realms
2.5 Kerberos Limitations
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Kerberos is a good solution to solve the security problems on an open network,
but it still has several shortcomings:
• E very n etw ork service m u st be individually m o d ified  fo r use w ith Kerberos 
[12]. Due to the design of the Kerberos, each application must be modified to 
use Kerberos for authentication. The process of modifying an application is called 
Kerberizing the application. To Kerberize an application, the application’s source 
code is required.
• Kerberos doesn ft w ork w ell in  a tim e-sharing environm ent Kerberos is designed 
for an environment in which there is one user per workstation. Because of the difficulty of sharing 
data between different processes running on the same U N IX  computer, Kerberos keeps tickets in 
the “/  tmp ” director)). I f  a user is sharing the computer with several other people, it is possible 
that the user's tickets can be stolen, that is, copied by an attacker, stolen tickets can then be used 
to obtain fraudulent service [12]. This problem is much worse for a shared PC or Mac 
running an insecure operating system like Windows 95/98 or MacOS. If an 
attacker has stolen other user’s tickets and the attacker is familiar with Kerberos 
API or GSSAPI and the Kerberizing process, the attacker can write a program to 
use that user’s stolen ticket to impersonate that user.
• Kerberos requires a secure Kerberos server. By design, Kerberos requires that there 
be a secure central server that maintains the master password database. To ensure security, the 
Kerberos server should be run on a secure dedicated machine [12]. Any unnecessary services
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(such as POP, FTP and R-commands daemons) should be shut down. The 
Kerberos server must be kept in a physically secure place.
• Kerberos requires a continuously available Kerberos server [12]. If the 
Kerberos Authentication Server goes down, the whole Kerberos network can not 
be used. So normally, a backup Kerberos Authentication Server called slave KDC 
is needed.
• K erberos stores all passw ords encrypted w ith a single k e y  [12]. All passwords 
stored in the Kerberos server are encrypted with the server’s master key, which 
resides on the same hard disk as the encrypted passwords. This means that, in 
case the Kerberos server is compromised, all user passwords are compromised.
• Kerberos does n o t p ro tec t against m odifications to system  softw are (Trojan  
horses). Kerberos does not have the computer authenticate itself to the user; so there is no way 
for a user sitting at a computer to determine whether the computer has been compromised [12]. A 
knowledgeable attacker can easily exploit this weakness. For example, an attacker 
could simply modify a workstation’s system login program which copies every 
username/password combination typed into a file. Later, the attacker can 
impersonate these users using their passwords.
• Kerberos m a y  resu lt in  a cascading loss o f  trust. A.notherproblem with Kerberos is 
that i f  a server password or a user password is broken or otherwise disclosed, it is possible for an 
eavesdropper to use that password to decrypt other tickets and use this information to spoof 
servers and users [12].
Kerberos is a workable system based on the secret key cryptography for network 
security, and it is widely used. A system based on public key cryptography would 
probably be simpler and perhaps more secure. A more secure authentication system 
would combine:
1. Something that a user knows (e.g. password).
2. Something that a user has (e.g. a smart card or a token).
3. Something that a user is (e.g. fingerprint, face recognition, etc.).
Chapter 3 
Implementation of Unification
3.1 Possible Implementations
3.1.1 The KDC servers
To unify the heterogeneous networks (AIX4.1, Redhat LINUX, and NT 4.0) 
using a Kerberos Authentication server, a master KDC and a slave KDC are needed. 
Because the more other services that are run on the KDCs, the greater the possibility 
is that the KDCs could be compromised, the KDCs should be dedicated servers 
which are only used for authentication. The CS department at the University of 
Montana doesn’t want to spend a lot of money on these servers, since the CS 
department is not very big and the authentication workload is not very heavy. So a 
solution might be to use two Intel486 LINUX machines as KDCs. That should be 
enough for the CS department. The KDCs must be located in a physically secure 
place. If the KDCs are compromised, the whole network will be compromised. 
When a user changes his/her Kerberos password, only the master KDC’s password 
database has been updated. Any changes of password only occur on master KDC. In
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order to let the slave KDC know about password changes, a cron job needs to be set 
up to make the master KDC to periodically propagate the password database to the 
slave KDC. Another cron job also needs to be set up, which periodically propagates 
the current time from the KDC to other machines. If the time difference (clockskew) 
between clients and KDC is larger than 5 minutes, authentication will fail, even with 
the correct password.
3.1.2 The Application Servers and Clients
All AIX/LINUX machines except for the KDCs can be both application servers 
and clients. To use Kerberos authentication server, the Kerberized daemons and 
clients must replace the existing daemons and clients. The Kerberized daemons 
include telnetd, ftpd, klogind, kshd..., the Kerberized clients include telnet, ftp, 
klogin, ksh, kinit, kdestroy, kpasswd... A configuration file “krb5.conf” also needs to 
be copied into “/e tc” subdirectory. Actually, the same copy of “krb5.conf’ is shared 
among all the machines. To obtain a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) implicitly when a 
user logs in, the regular login must be replaced with the Kerberized login — “klogin”. 
So when a user logs in, the user has obtained a TGT implicitly, the user doesn’t need 
to use “kinit” to get it explicitly. When the user logs out, all his/her tickets need to be 
deleted using “kdestroy”. In case that the user forgets to do this, “kdestroy” should
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be added to his/her “.logout” file. The user should lock the screen, if he/she leaves 
his/her workstation without logging out.
3.1.3 Some Issues about the login process
3.1.3.1 Local Login to U nix workstation(AIX, Redhat L IN U X )
After the Kerberos has been deployed on the CS department’s LAN, the regular 
login has been replaced with the Kerberized login— “klogin”. When a user sits in 
front of any UNIX (AIX, Redhat LINUX) workstation and wants to login, the user 
types in his/her login ID and Kerberos password. The Kerberized login — “klogin” — 
then encrypts an authenticator using his/her Kerberos password and transfers the 
authenticator (including the service name TGS —Ticket Granting Service, and a time 
stamp) and his/her login ID to the KDC. The KDC knows the user’s Kerberos 
password, so the KDC tries to decrypt the authenticator. If the KDC succeeds, the 
KDC sends back a TGT and “klogin” lets the user login. (A more detailed 
description of the process of obtaining TGT is in chapter 2) If  the login does not 
succeed, “klogin” will do the same thing as the regular login program namely 
compare the password the user typed with his/her local password stored in 
“/etc/passw d” (or “/etc/shadow”, if a shadow-password mechanism is used). If the 
password matches, “klogin” lets the user login without obtaining the TGT. If  the user 
still wants to obtain the TGT, the user has to use “kinit” and types in the correct
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Kerberos password to get it. After the user has the TGT, the user can use any 
Kerberized service of the heterogeneous network without typing a password. It’s very 
convenient and secure.
3.1.3.2 Local L ogon to N T  W orkstation/Server
Cygnus Solutions Inc. provides a freeware Kerberos package for NT, which 
includes the KDC service, the Kadmin service, and the Kerberized client softwares 
such as kinit, kpasswd, kerbnet, ktelnet and gina. The KDC service and Kadmin 
service can only run on NT server/workstation, the Kerberized client software can 
run on Windows 95 or Windows NT server/workstation. So an NT machine can be 
configured to be a KDC.
The “gina” package is login software that can replace the regular NT login 
software. There are two installation options for “gina”: Kerberos authentication 
required, and Kerberos authentication not required.
•  Kerberos authentication not required
If this option is chosen, When a user logs on, first, “gina” will check the password 
the user typed in with the Windows NT PDC (Primary Domain Controller) to see if 
it matches the password stored in the PDC’s password database. If it does not match, 
“gina” gives the user a message box that says something like “password wrong, retry”
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and won’t let the user logon. If the password matches, “gina” will try to obtain a 
TGT from the KDC using the password the user typed in. If the password the user 
typed in is the same as his/her Kerberos password, “gina” will obtain a TGT 
implicidy for the user and let the user logon. If the password the user typed is not the 
same as his/her Kerberos password, but is same as his/her NT domain password, 
“gina” will give the user a message box that says something like “Kerberos password 
wrong and can not obtain TGT” and let the user logon without obtaining the TGT.
• Kerberos authentication required
If this option is chosen, the process is almost the same as the above scenario, 
except that when the user’s password matches the PDC’s stored password but 
doesn’t match his/her Kerberos password, “gina” still gives the user a message box 
that says something like “Kerberos password wrong, retry” and won’t let the user 
logon. Thus, in this case, the user’s password in the Windows NT PDC must match 
the Kerberos password to be able to login NT workstation or server.
3.1.3.3 Over-the-network telnet from W indows 9 5 /N T  to U N IX
(AIX, Redhat LIN U X )
• Using non-Kerberized telnet
If the application servers have been configured so that they can accept non- 
Kerberized clients, then a user can use non-Kerberized client software such as regular 
TELNET, FTP, and etc. Due to the large existing base of non-Kerberized 
applications, normally, the application servers need to be configured to accept non-
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Kerberized client applications. Suppose a user uses a non-Kerberized application, 
such as regular telnet, to telnet to the remote Kerberos-enhanced AIX or LINUX 
workstation. When the user types in his/her login ID and password, the user’s 
password will be transferred to the remote machine in clear text. So if someone is 
eavesdropping on the Internet or CS department Ethernet, he/she can catch the 
user’s password and impersonate the user later. When the user’s login ID and 
password have been transferred to the remote machine’s Kerberized login software, 
the process of obtaining the TGT is same as local login. If the user wants to use other 
services in the Kerberos realm from the CS department workstation, the user doesn’t 
need to type his/her password anymore, since the user has a TGT for the whole 
Kerberos realm. That means if the user uses a regular telnet client to access a 
Kerberos-enhanced network, then it’s safer than to use a regular telnet to access a 
non-Kerberos-enhanced network. For example, assume that Kerberos has been 
deployed on the CS department’s LAN. When a user uses a regular telnet client to 
telnet to “garnet”, the user’s password will be transferred over the Internet in clear 
text once. Then the user has a TGT that resides on “garnet”. Then if the user wants 
to telnet to other machines from “garnet”, say, “ninepipe”, the user doesn’t need to 
type his/her password again. The user only needs to type “telnet ninepipe”, the user 
will be logged in without supplying a password, since the user is using the Kerberized 
telnet client that resides in “garnet”. If the CS department’s LAN is not Kerberos- 
enhanced, then when the user telnets to “garnet”, the user’s password will be 
transferred over the Internet once. When the user wants to telnet to “ninepipe”, the
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user has to type his/her password again, so the user’s password will be transferred 
over the Internet another time. Although it’s better, transferring the password in clear 
text one time is enough for eavesdropper to catch it. So I encourage people to use 
Kerberized client applications. Cygnus solution Inc. has a free package — Kerbnet 
that includes kpasswd, kinit, ktelnet for Windows 95/NT. I wrote a GUI Kerberized 
FTP for Windows 95/NT.
• Using Kerberized telnet
To use Kerberized telnet on Windows 95/NT, “kinit” or “kerbnet” (GUI 
software which combines “kinit” and “kpasswd” together) is needed to obtain the 
TGT. Next, the Kerberized telnet can be launched which will automatically log the 
user in.
3.1.4 Password Synchronization and User Account Setup
The scenarios for logon to NT domain and for login to UNIX (AIX, LINUX) 
locally are quite different.
When a user logs in to UNIX, “klogin” will first try to match the password the 
user typed in with his/her Kerberos password, if the match succeeds, “klogin” will let 
the user login. If it does not succeed, “klogin” works like regular login that checks the 
password the user typed in with his/her local password. If it matches, “klogin” lets 
the user login, if not, the user has to retry.
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When the user logs on to an NT domain, “gina” will first try to match the 
password the user typed in with his/her NT domain password. If the password does 
not match, “gina” let the user retry. If the password does match, “gina” will try to 
obtain the TGT using the password the user typed in. If succeed, the user will logon 
and get the TGT. If not, depending on which installation option of “gina” is chosen, 
either the user can logon without obtaining the TGT or the user cannot logon with a 
chance to try again.
This leads to an important issue on setting up user accounts and password 
synchronization. Under the UNIX login scenario, the user only needs to know the 
Kerberos password, the local password can be generated randomly and the user 
doesn’t need to know it. When users change their passwords, they only need to 
change the Kerberos password; the local passwords will never be changed. But on 
NT, due to the “gina” logon scenario, if the user wants to achieve single logon, the 
user’s NT domain password and Kerberos password must be kept the same.
For example, if I’m the system administrator, I need to open a user account for a 
user, Joe. I can setup an user account “joe” on a workstation and generate a random 
password for “joe” and propagate this local account to every UNIX workstation. 
Then I need to setup a Kerberos user account “joe” for him and generate a Kerberos 
password for “joe”, and Joe needs to know this Kerberos password. Then I setup an 
NT domain user account “joe” for Joe, where the NT domain password is the same 
as his Kerberos password. I also need to guarantee that the login ID is same for the 
N T domain and Kerberos.
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When Joe wants to change his password, if he changes his password on UNIX, he 
only needs to change his Kerberos password. After he is done, he might go to an NT 
machine and want to logon, he can either logon without obtaining the TGT or simply 
can’t logon depending on the “gina” installation option. So a mechanism is needed to 
synchronize NT domain password changes and Kerberos password changes. I wrote 
a Win32 GUI program “ntpasswd” which first changes the NT domain password and 
then makes a system call to call “kpasswd” to change the Kerberos password.
“ntpasswd” first prompts the user to input his/her old password and new 
password and confirmed new password, then calls the NetUserChangePasswordQ 
API function to change the NT domain password. It then detects the environment 
variables fHOMEDRIVE, $HOMEDIR, $ICPASSWD_PATH, and creates a 
temporary file in the user’s home directory. It outputs the user’s old password and 
new password and confirmed new password to this file, then through 
$>I<PASSWD_PATH finds “kpasswd.exe”, and makes a system call like “kpasswd < 
tmpfilename”, and then deletes the temporary file. Normally, in an NT environment, 
each regular user may not have write permission on any directory except his/her own 
home directory, that’s why I detect $HOMEDRIVE and $>HOMEDIR. This 
guarantees that the creation of the temporary file will be successful. Normally, only 
the user has full control on his/her home directory; other users, even the 
administrator, don’t have read rights on the user’s home directory. Because the 
temporary file contains the user’s password in clear text, if the system is setup with 
home directories owned by users, putting this temporary file into the user’s home
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directory is safe. This means that after Kerberos has been deployed, if a user wants to 
change his/her password, and doesn’t want to change it twice (once for Kerberos, 
once for NT domain), the user needs to go to an NT workstation and uses 
“ntpasswd” to change his/her password. See figure 3.1 for the interface of 
“ntpasswd”.
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Figure 3.1 Interface of ntpasswd
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3.1.5 The Cost of Deploying Kerberos
The source code and executable of Kerberos on UNIX is freely available from 
MIT. Cygnus Solution Inc. has an implementation of Kerberos on NT called 
KerbNet that is also freely downloadable. KerbNet contains a Kerberized telnet 
client for Windows 95/NT. I wrote a Kerberized FTP client for Windows 95/NT. 
I’m going to make it a freeware. After the Kerberos has been deployed, it should be 
fairly easy for users to use. It’s also fairly easy for the CS students to download, install 
and use the Kerberized client software (such as Kerberized TELNET and FTP) on 
their personally owned PCs. Thus, all of the software is free.
3.2 Two Test Network Models
I have setup two test network models.
• Model one
I used a Pentium Pro 200 machine (“dillon”) running Redhat LINUX 2.0 as a 
master KDC, a Pentium 120 machine (“glasgow”) running Redhat LINUX 2.0 as an 
application server and client (see figure 3.2).
I installed MIT Kerberos Version 5 on “dillon”. I downloaded the source code of 
MIT Kerberos Version 5 and compiled it to get the executable, since MIT only 
provides the source code for Kerberos Version 5. I installed Kerbnet Kerberos from
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Cygnus solutions Inc. on “glasgow”. I installed MIT Kerberos Version 5 on 
“glendive”.
• Model two
I used a IBM PowerStation 220 machine — “gaesl” — running AIX4.1 as master 
KDC, a Pentium 200 machine — “dillon” — which is installed Redhat LINUX 2.0 as 
slave KDC and application server, a Pentium 120 machine — “glasgow” — which is 
installed Windows NT server 4.0 as client (see figure 3.3).
I installed Kerbnet Kerberos for AIX on “gaesl” . I installed MIT Kerberos 
Version 5 into “dillon”. I installed Kerbnet Kerberos for NT into “glasgow”.
Both test network models met the goals I mentioned in Chapter 1, except for goal 
#2  — “Users should be able to change their password from any workstation”. The 
MIT Kerberos and Cygnus Kerberos work perfectly together. Actually, Cygnus just 
uses the MIT Kerberos source code and modifies it to be easy-to-install and more 
user-friendly. Cygnus also developed an NT Kerberos version. Both networks can 
accept both non-Kerberized clients and Kerberized clients. This will guarantee that a 
lot of non-Kerberized clients, especially in a Windows or Mac environment will still 
work. I tested ntpasswd on “glasgow”, it works perfectly. It guarantees the 
synchronization of NT domain password change and Kerberos password change.
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Chapter 4
A Multi-threaded Implementation of 
Kerberized FTP for Windows 95 /N T
4.1 Using “Kerberized” Applications
Client/server applications must be modified to use Kerberos for authentication. 
The process of modifying the applications to make it Kerberos-aware is called 
Kerberizing. Kerberizing an application is the most difficult part of installing 
Kerberos. Fortunately, the MIT Kerberos implementation includes most of the 
popular applications for Unix (the Berkeley R-commands, telnet, and POP) that have 
been Kerberized. Other applications have been Kerberized by vendors and are 
included in their supported products, such as Cygnus Solutions Inc.’s KerbNet 
System. The availability of Kerberized applications will improve with time.
It is generally necessary to modify the client/server protocol when Kerberizing an 
application, unless the protocol designer has already made provisions for an 
authentication exchange.
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More recent implementations of Kerberos provide a Generic Security Services 
Application Programmer Interface (GSSAPI). The GSSAPI provides a standard 
programming interface that is authentication mechanism independent. Using GSSAPI allows the 
application programmer to design an application and application protocol which can use alternative 
different authentication technologies, including Kerberos [6]. The use of the GSSAPI in 
application programs is recommended wherever possible.
Because it is a generic authentication interface, the GSSAPI does not support all 
o f the functionality provided by Kerberos. For example, Kerberos’s notion of user- 
to-user authentication is not currently supported. Hence, an application programmer 
will not always be able to use the GSSAPI in all cases, and may have to use the 
Kerberos API in order to use some features.
4.2 Introduction to GSSAPI
The GSSAPI provides generic security services to its callers, and is intended for 
implementation on top of alternative underlying authentication protocols. Typically, 
GSSAPI callers will be application protocols into which security enhancements are 
integrated through invocation of services provided by the GSSAPI. The GSSAPI 
allows a caller application to authenticate a principal identity associated with a peer 
application, to delegate rights to a peer, and to apply security services such as 
confidentiality and integrity on a per-message basis.
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There are four stages to using the GSSAPI:
• The application acquires a set of credentials with which it may prove its identity to other 
processes. The application's credentials vouch for its global identity, which may or may not be 
related to the local username under which it is running
• A  pair of communicating applications establish a joint security context using their credentials. 
The security context is a pair of GSSAPI data structures that contain shared state information, 
which is required in order that per-message security services may be provided. A s  part of the 
establishment of a security context, the context initiator is authenticated to the responder, and 
may require that the responder is authenticated in turn. The initiator may optionally give the 
responder the right to initiate further security contexts. This transfer of rights is termed 
delegation, and is achieved by creating a set of credentials, similar to those used by the originating 
application, but which may be used by the responder. To establish and maintain the shared 
information that makes up the security context, certain GSSAPI calls will return a token data 
structure, which is a cryptographically protected opaque data type. The caller of such a GSSAPI 
routine is responsible for transferring the token to the peer application, which should then pass it 
to a corresponding GSSAPI routine which will decode it and extract the information.
• Per-message services are invoked to apply either:
(a), integrity and data origin authentication, or
(b). confidentiality, integrity and data origin authentication to application data, which are treated 
by GSSAPI as arbitrary octet-strings. The application transmitting a message that it wishes to 
protect will call the appropriate GSSAPI routine (sign or seal) to apply protection, specifying the 
appropriate security context, and send the result to the receiving application. The receiver will
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pass the received data to the corresponding decoding routine (verify or unseal) to remove the 
protection and validate the data.
• A t  the completion of a communications session (which may extend across several connections), the 
peer applications call GSSAPI routines to delete the security context. Multiple contexts may 
also he used (either successively or simultaneously) within a single communications association 
[6].
4.3 FTP Security Extension
4.3.1 Introduction
The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) currently defined in STD 9, RFC 959[7] uses 
usernames and passwords passed in clear text to authenticate clients to servers (via 
the USER and PASS commands), except for services such as “anonymous” FTP 
archives. This leads to a security risk that passwords can be stolen through 
monitoring of local and wide-area networks.
Except for the problem of authenticating users in a secure manner, there is also 
the problem of authenticating servers, protecting sensitive data and/or verifying its 
integrity. An attacker may be able to access valuable or sensitive data simply by 
monitoring a network. An active attacker may also initiate spurious file transfers to 
and from a site of the attacker’s choice, and may invoke other commands on the
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server. FTP does not currendy have any provision for the encryption or verification 
of the authenticity of commands, replies, or transferred data.
4.3.2 The FTP Security Extension Standard
FTP Security Extension Standard addresses (adapted from [8], RFC 2228):
1. How to authenticate users to servers in a secure manner.
2. How to protect command channel.
Command MIC is used to protect the integrity of the command channel (Other 
people can not modify the command channel); Command ENC is used to 
protect the privacy of the command channel (Other people can not see the 
contents o f the command channel).
3. How to protect data channel.
Command PROT and PBSZ are used to protect the data channel.
The following commands are optional, but dependent on each other. They are
extensions to the FTP Access Control Commands.
AUTH (Authentication/Security Mechanism)
AD AT (Authentication/Security Data)
PROT (Data Channel Protection Level)
PBSZ (Protection Buffer Size)
CCC (Clear Command Channel)
MIC (Integrity Protected Command)
CONF (Confidentiality Protected Command)
ENC (Privacy Protected Command)
-— from [8]
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In my Kerberized FTP, I implemented AUTH, AD AT (for authentication), MIC 
and ENC (for protection of control channel).
4.4 Implementation of Kerberized FTP
The Kerberized FTP client is a GUI, multithreaded application for Windows 95 
and Windows NT). This FTP client implements four new FTP extension commands 
(AUTH, ADAT, MIC, ENC) and all the basic regular FTP commands (such as 
SEND, RECV, USER, LIST, etc.).
Some features:
• Can connect to Kerberized FTP servers and regular FTP servers: Due to the
large base of existing regular FTP server, the Kerberized FTP client can connect 
to both Kerberized FTP servers and regular FTP servers.
• Multithreaded: When sending, receiving, and listing files, a new thread will be 
launched to guarantee that the transfer of large amount of data won’t block the 
GUI interface. So you can browse the local file system, see online help and 
“about” information while transferring a big file or a large directory.
• Uses the Registry to maintain most recently connected hosts: This uses the 
system registry database to store the most recently connected host names. So next 
time, when you want to connect to the host which has been connected before, 
you can just choose its name from the “host” droplist.
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• Display local and remote file system visually: This uses two listview windows 
to display local and remote file system visually. You can browse local and remote 
file systems just like “WS-FTP”.
• Indicate the progress of file transfer: This uses a progress bar to indicate the 
progress of file transfer visually and how much data has been transferred.
• Beep to indicate file transfer finished: After a file transfer is done, a beep will 
remind you that file transfer is done.
4.4.1 Im plem entation o f the Authentication Part
To Kerberize an application, the most important part is the authentication part. 
The authentication part must be rewritten to support whatever authentication 
mechanism you want to support. Using GSSAPI will make this job a little easier but 
cannot achieve all the functionality provided by the underlying authentication 
protocol. But in general, GSSAPI will be sufficient for most situations. I used 
GSSAPI to write my Kerberized FTP client.
The following is the state transition diagram for the authentication part:
Two common paths:
• For non-Kerberized FTP server (fo llow ---------------► path).
• For Kerberized FTP server (fo llo w ---------------->  path).
USER
AUTH
V I 234
334
ADAT
4yz, 5yz 335
235
USER
2yz
PASS
Authenticated
Need Password
Authorized Login
Need Security Data
U nauthenticate d 
(new connection)
Figure 4.1: Login Authentication State Diagram
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4.4.2 H ow  to use the Kerberized FTP
This GUI Kerberized FTP client supports both Kerberized FTP server and 
regular FTP server. To use the F IT  to open a connection to remote Kerberized FTP 
server, you have to obtain a Ticket Granting Ticket first using Kerbnet System 
explicitly, or if your operating system is Windows NT, you can obtain a Ticket 
Granting Ticket through the program “gina” which replaces the regular logon and 
obtains the ticket for you implicitly.
Here is how to use Kerbnet System to obtain Ticket Granting 'Ticket.
• After double clicking Kerbnet icon you g e t:
KerhNet
End Time Ticket
No Tickets
C h a n g e  P a s s w o rd
Figure 4.2. Initial Kerbnet Interface
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• After typing UserlD, password, realm (only needed the very first time you use 
Kerbnet) and then click login button, you get:
■x
File H e lp
Start Time End Time Ticket
Mar 10 09:13 Mar 10 19:13 krbtgt/CS.UMT.EDU@CS.UMT.EDU (FPI) B
UMT.EDU
■sss rasBraesnlB
trange Password... 
      .
. . : ; ...... ; J
Figure 4.3. After obtaining Ticket Granting Ticket
• After you have obtained the Ticket Granting Ticket, you can launch Kerberized 
FTP by double clicking on its icon. 'There are two options in the login window, 
privacy and integrity. The integrity option is the default option, which guarantees 
the integrity of the command channel. With this option, intruders can not modify 
any FTP command. The privacy option encrypts the command channel, which 
guarantees both the integrity and the privacy. With this option, intruders can not 
see and modify any FTP command.
Remote System
“iie nameFile name ghangeDirChangeOir
. MakeDir
KFTP.HLP
MFC42D.DLL
MFCN42D.DLL
MSVCRTD.DLL
gssapi.dll
KFTP.GID
kftaexe
Rename
R em ove
R e fe sh
I iiiiiiii  i ii ii  
■ : ' .. :: srwsw* ssn » «  |
Option I
...................
------
& Login
I' " ..................
H ost Name ; | d illn n .cs.u m t.ed u
£ UserlD; |iian|
C  Privacy (* Integrity 
Cancel j
Rle tise
Figure 4.4. GSS_FTP initial Interface
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• Type or choose a host name and type your user name and click “OK” button.
220
200
1 0 322
x e  jsio>
[BINARY.mode data connection for 
complete.
GSS FTP Connected to : dillon.cs.umt.edu
C:\Kftp
; ; , . . .
File name File te e
1 0 1 7 7KFTP.HLP
MFC42D.DLL
MFCN42D.DLL
MSVCRTD.DLL
gssapi.dll
KFTP.GID
kftp.exe
1393152
4 1 9E
3 7 3 2 4 8
FriMJ Refe, h
T u e  k—
3347C3
TueR Diflnfo 
  - .56321
___
_______________________
/h o m e/ nan
hieFile name
name
0 .. 1024
iS .x f m  1024
&  mail 1024
* FVWM95-2-er... 1664  B .Xauthority 0
.Xdefaults 3 7 8 5
.bash_history 
.b a sh jo g o u t  
,bash_profile  
1 $  hashrc  
.'V .pinerc
Remove 
E e fe *
mUssml l l i S I l !
■n r ' ...
«• Binary
   ____
MH9HB«W: .
* S  :■ * I .. 3 1.1 *»-.•»» .•,*«!-. . . 'I
■ r7 I i I o I. r ■ . ! Close 1. Log j Help
.............
-a- j
..
■ tV & K t-1- 'VHkLMVe 8SSN •‘“X 'dJHZ-' T *:* . i - • Option v I
Figure 4.5. After Logon
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• After you logon, you can recheck the Kerbnet window and see that the Ticket for 
the FTP server has been obtained.
• Then, you can browse the local and remote file systems through the two listview 
windows and choose what to transfer.
To know7 more about how to use this FTP client, please see the online help system 
of the Kerberized FTP.
mmam^ ■
File Help
• : "■
,
Start T im e 
........... — L —
E nd T im e T icket
M ar10 10:56 Mar 10 20:56 krbtgt/CS UMT EDU@CS.UMT.EDU (FPI)
:
M ar10 10:57 Mar 10 20:56 ftp/dillon.cs.umt.edu@CS.UMT.EDU (FP)
P a ccw n rr i  B o a trdoSvVOiu n.edl
CS UMT.EDU
“ ;.... . „  . . _ x _ I
h a n g e  P assw ord .. .
\
 ,
Figure 4.6. After obtaining FTP service ticket
Chapter 5
Conclusions
This project consists of two parts. The first part is to find a feasible solution to 
unify the authentication for the heterogeneous networks of the CS department at the 
University of Montana. The goals include:
• A global user account database, which means that any user must be able to login 
to the same account with the same password on any workstation
• Users should be able to change their password from any workstation
• Any system must work with a shadow password system on both AIX and LINUX
• Users should be able to access any workstation over the Internet (for example, a 
student or faculty should be able to login to a workstation using a PPP 
connection to an ISP from home)
• Unencrypted passwords should not be transferred over the network (including the 
LAN of CS department and the Internet)
• The solution should be relatively easy to use, maintain, and administrate
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investigated and studied a lot about how Kerberos works, how to administrate 
Kerberos, how to make the use of Kerberos as transparent as possible. Chapter 2 
covers most of these topics. I’ve set up two small test networks to test if Kerberos 
can really satisfy the CS department’s requirements. Chapter 3 covers this. I also 
wrote a program “ntpasswd” which synchronizes an NT domain password and a 
Kerberos password. Note that the goal #2 — “Users should be able to change their 
passwords from any workstation” was not met.
There are Kerberos implementations both on UNIX and on NT which means 
that a UNIX or a NT machine can be used as the KDC. Due to the small size of the 
CS department at the University of Montana, the CS department won’t want to spend 
a lot of money on the KDCs. Two Intel 486 machines should be enough for the 
KDCs. Because NT is not as stable as UNIX and N T’s system overhead is bigger 
than UNIX, the performance of a Intel 486 machine running NT server 4.0 is much 
poorer than that of a Intel 486 machine running LINUX. So I recommend using two 
Intel 486 machine running LINUX as the KDCs.
Client/server applications must be modified to use Kerberos for authentication; 
such Kerberos-aware applications are said to be Kerberized. Kerberizing an 
application is the most difficult part of installing Kerberos. Fortunately, the MIT 
reference implementation includes the popular applications (the Berkeley R- 
commands, telnet, and POP) for a variety of UNIX platforms with support for
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Kerberos already added. Cygnus Inc. also provides a free software package Kerbnet 
for W in95/NT that includes a program used for obtaining a Ticket Granting Ticket, 
a Kerberized telnet, and more. But they didn’t provide a Kerberized FTP for 
W in95/NT. This leads to the second part of this project, developing a Kerberized 
FTP for W in95/NT. I investigated the FTP protocol, the FTP security extension 
protocol, GSSAPI and more. I used Visual C++ 5.0 and the Cygnus GSSAPI library 
to develop this GUI Kerberized FTP for Win95/NT. Chapter 4 covers this software.
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